Evolutionary Psychology: The Science of Human Nature

Having been tickled by Google Alert that my name had been mentioned in the comments at Pharyngula (P. Z. Myer's blog), I took a quick look. Just a few comments for now:

1) I became an evolutionary psychologist when studying the behavioral ecology of Microtus pennsylvanicus got boring. Those cute little field voles got boring because their ethology is relatively simple. Human ethology is a lot more interesting, mostly because it is a lot more complex. Should we not try to study it because it is more complex? Or because it might not jibe with some people's political preconceptions?

2) I assign Gould & Lewontin's "spandrels" paper to my students in evolutionary biology, along with various criticisms of it. I also assign Eldredge & Gould's "punk eek" paper and Gould and Vrba's "exaptation" paper (along with close to three dozen others, not to mention the entire Origin of Species, 1st. ed.). I also give them chunks of George William's 1966 classic, Adaptation and Natural Selection, so that they will know exactly how "onerous" the concept of "adaptation" actually is.

3) Here's the definition of "adaptation" I use:

An evolutionary adaptation is any heritable phenotypic character whose frequency of appearance in a population is the result of increased reproductive success relative to alternative versions of that heritable phenotypic character.

4) Here are the criteria I believe are most useful when one is attempting to determine if one is dealing with an "adaptation":

Qualification 1: An evolutionary adaptation will be expressed by most of the members of a given population, in a pattern that approximates a normal distribution;

Qualification 2: An evolutionary adaptation can be correlated with underlying anatomical and physiological structures, which constitute the efficient (or proximate) cause of the evolution of the adaptation;

Qualification 3: An evolutionary adaptation can be correlated with a pre-existing evolutionary environment of adaptation (EEA), the circumstances of which can then be correlated with differential survival and reproduction; and

Qualification 4: An evolutionary adaptation can be correlated with the presence and expression of an underlying gene or gene complex, which directly or indirectly causes and influences the expression of the phenotypic trait that constitutes the adaptation.

To me, it seems reasonable that if one can apply those to a specific human behavior, one can make arguments about its evolutionary derivation. Would anyone disagree?

As for the ridiculous idea that evolutionary psychology only deals with sex, has anyone making such a claim actually read a textbook on the subject? Here are several:

Human Evolutionary Psychology

Evolutionary Psychology: The New Science of the Mind (4th Edition)

Evolution and Human Behavior, 2nd Edition: Darwinian Perspectives on Human Nature

Evolutionary Psychology: The Science of Human Nature

[Full Disclosure Notice: The fourth title is indeed by Yours Truly.]

If you haven't, then please do so, and then we can discuss these questions.

While we're on the subject, Part II of Evolutionary Psychology: The Science of Human Nature (on the ethology of between-group behavior in humans) is coming out in May. My next project is an introductory textbook in evolutionary biology, entitled Evolutionary Biology: The Darwinian Revolutions, again in two parts. Part I (due out in September) is The Modern Synthesis and Part II (due out next May) is The Evolving Synthesis.

After that (if I live that long) will be On Purpose: The Evolution of Design by Means of Natural Selection (won't there be some fireworks when that comes out?), in which I present one of the core arguments for The Metaphysical Foundations of the Biological Sciences, in the spirit of E. A. Burtt's The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science. Should be fun!

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As always, comments, criticisms, and suggestions are warmly welcomed!

--Allen

Is Science True?

In my experience, everyone bases their "arguments on certain metaphysical suppositions, scientists and non-scientists included. As a good friend and student of E. A. Burtt, I have found his Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science to be extraordinarily useful in this regard. In fact, I have begun work on what I hope will be a companion volume: Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Biological Science, in which I will examine the assumptions that underlie the science of biology as it is practiced today.

One of the bedrock assumptions underlying both modern physics and modern biology is non-teleology: the assumption that natural processes do not include any teleological input. I personally think that this is wrong, and base my objection to this idea on Ernst Mayr's monumental book, Toward a New Philosophy of Biology, published in 1988. Mayr argued very persuasively that teleological explanations are entirely appropriate in biology insofar as they refer to the development and maintenance of living organisms. According to Mayr, both of these processes (and indeed all biological processes) are directed by programs (i.e. genomes, etc.) that pre-exist the entities and processes that they specify and regulate. In the jargon of the current debate, genomes and other developmental programs are "designs" for the assembly and operation of living organisms.

However, Mayr also argued very strongly that the origin of biological programs – that is, the various mechanisms of biological evolution – need not (and apparently do not) include any teleological component. Like all physical processes, there is no detectable "grand design" (much less a Grand Designer) which/Who has formulated beforehand the programs that regulate life. In other words, teleology is entirely appropriate when applied to life and the operation of living programs, but not when applied to the origin of life or the origin of living programs.

So, what does this say about the question of whose opinions to trust when considering these issues? My first criterion is skepticism: if someone claims to know the truth about anything at all (including, of course, the contents of their own mind), my immediate reaction is intense skepticism. Science (at least that version of it that has been practiced since the 17th century) isn't about truth. It's about reasonable confidence in explanatory models, all of which are grounded on a metaphysical assumption of the usefulness of methodological naturalism. Notice I wrote "usefulness", not "truth", because as far as I can tell the only "truth" that exists on either side of the evolution/ID divide is a version of Colbert's "truthiness". It feels like "truth", but isn't really. In my opinion, "experts" are people who keep these distinctions in mind at all times, and do not easily (if ever) use absolute statements when talking about nature.

For example, I have an immediate, knee-jerk negative reaction to the title of Jerry Coyne's book, Why Evolution is True, and indeed to much of what he writes for the general public. Consider a similar title, Why Quantum Mechanics is True, or if you prefer Why the Gas Laws are True. How would a physicist react to titles such as these? I hope (and my general experience has been) that they would object to the word "true", and also perhaps to the question "why". Physics isn't about "truth" and doesn't usually ask about "why" things happen. Physics is about "useful" and "consistent" and "empirically testable" models of reality, and it's about "how" things happen, not "why" they happen.

Indeed, in the natural sciences (including biology) the answer to the question "how" is the same as the answer to the question "why". How do birds come to have wings? They inherit a genetic and developmental program that, via interactions with their environment, produces those structures we call "wings". Why do birds come to have wings? Same answer. How have birds acquired these genetic and developmental programs? They evolved by natural selection and other evolutionary mechanisms. Why have birds acquired these genetic and developmental programs? Again, same answer.

Speculating as to whether the biological processes by which the programs that specify and regulate living organisms and processes are somehow externally/supernaturally directed seems to me to be metaphysical arguments, rather than scientific ones. Interesting, compelling even, but not part of science, at least as it has been practiced for a very long time.

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As always, comments, criticisms, and suggestions are warmly welcomed!

--Allen

Many Metabolisms, Many Origins?

An unspoken but widely held belief among both evolutionary biologists (and some "intelligent design" supporters) is the idea that life (or, to be more specific, living organisms and/or metabolic processes) originated once a very long time ago. Along with my fellow biology majors, I was taught this by William T. Keeton in introductory biology at Cornell, where we also were told that if life (or biomolecules) somehow spontaneously started again today, it would immediately be scarfed up by already living organisms.

This idea ultimately derives from the last paragraph of Darwin's Origin of Species, in which he proposed that

"There is grandeur in this view of life, with its several powers, having been originally breathed into a few forms or into one; and that, whilst this planet has gone cycling on according to the fixed law of gravity, from so simple a beginning endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful have been, and are being, evolved." [Origin of Species, 1st edition, 1859]

Darwin asserted this partly to contrast his theory of evolution from that of Lamarck's, which included the idea that life was continuously arising spontaneously, generating new phylogenetic lines of organisms throughout deep evolutionary time. The discovery of the (almost) "universal" genetic code in the 1950s by Crick, Nirenberg, Holley, Khorana, et al provided strong evidence for the "one origin" hypothesis.

However, the fact that there is currently no evidence for an alternative "many origins" hypothesis doesn't necessarily support the conclusion that this hypothesis has been falsified. On the contrary, as the recent discovery by Felisa Wolfe-Simon of a "shadow arsenic metabolism" indicates, this lack of evidence is the result of lack of investigation, rather than actual lack of such origins. It is, in other words, quite possible that life (or at least biochemical processes similar to metabolic processes and molecules similar to "standard" biomolecules, and even cell-like structures incorporating both) is "originating" spontaneously all the time, but that we haven't noticed it because we haven't been looking. After all, nobody suspected the existence of an entire domain of living organisms (i.e. the Archaea) until Carl Woese starting looking two decades ago.

As J. B. S. Haldane — who formulated an early hypothesis for the origin of life — once quipped,

"[T]he Universe is not only queerer than we suppose, but queerer than we can suppose." [Haldane, J. B. S. (1927) Possible Worlds and Other Papers, page 227]

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As always, comments, criticisms, and suggestions are warmly welcomed!

--Allen

What is "Darwinism" and am I a "Darwinist"?

I don’t use the term “Darwinism” at all, any more than I would use the term “Newtonism” when referring to classical physical mechanics, “Einsteinism” to refer to relativity theory, “Bohr/Feinman/Heisenberg/Schroedingerism” to refer to quantum mechanics, or “Mendeleevianism” to refer to chemistry. What I and my colleagues (and friends) do is probably best described as “evolutionary biology”, and includes (at a bare minimum) the following:

1) the formulation and testing of a set of interconnected theories explaining the origin of biological diversity, consisting of descent with modification from common ancestors over deep geological time, describable via cladistic analysis, and supported by inference from multiple sources of empirical evidence, including comparative anatomy, biogeography, developmental biology, genomics, historical geology, and paleontology; and

2) the formulation and testing of a separate but related set of interconnected theories explaining the origin and modification of the phenotypic characteristics of living organisms, consisting (at a bare minumum) of the mechanisms of natural selection, sexual selection, genetic drift, and neutral molecular evolution in deep geological time, grounded (at least in part) in theoretical mathematical models of population genetics, depending on multiple sources of heritable phenotypic variation, and supported by inference from multiple sources of empirical evidence, including field and laboratory research in the fields of biochemistry, cell biology, comparative physiology, developmental biology, ecology, ethology, genetics, neurobiology, and physiological ecology.

Note that these two definitions of the principle domains of evolutionary biology correspond roughly to what are sometimes referred to as “macroevolutionary theory” and “microevolutionary theory” (in that order) and do not explicitly mention:

• theories of the origin of life from non-living materials, which are properly the purview of astrophysics, chemistry, and geology, not biology;

• the concept of “adaptation”, which has had a checkered past in evolutionary biology and is facing increasing challenges within the field; and

• teleology, which is almost never mentioned, except for those evolutionary biologists who have thought about it (which, in my experience, are relatively few), who generally assume that resort to teleological explanations in evolutionary biology is unnecessary. Not wrong, just unnecessary (not to mention unproductive as an empirical research hypothesis).

As philosophical concepts, both adaptation and teleology have a very long history, stretching back at least to Plato and Aristotle. However, recent developments in evolutionary theory, including (but not limited to) theories of epigenetics, exaptation, genetic drift/draft, neutral and nearly neutral molecular “drift” in deep evolutionary time, and punctuated equilibrium, have rendered the concept of “adaptation” as an increasingly marginal diversion rather than a central topic in evolutionary biology.

And teleology, rather than being considered “wrong” (when it is considered at all, which is seldom) is now increasingly being incorporated into new theories of “evolved agency”, especially in evolutionary psychology (my own field). I am currently working on a treatise on this latter subject, which I hope to finish before departing this veil of tears and laughter for that undiscovered country from whose bourn no traveller returns.

The Annotated Origin of Species

In November of 1859, the
London publishing house of John Murray brought out the first edition of what would become the most famous and important work of science of the 19th century: Charles Darwin's On the Origin of Species. The first edition of 1,250 copies sold out in one afternoon (first edition copies today fetch over a hundred thousand dollars on the rare book market) and was eventually reprinted over the next fifteen years in five increasingly popular editions. The success of the Origin catapulted Darwin from a relatively unknown specialist in the taxonomy of barnacles to the most famous naturalist of the 19th century and became the most widely read (and most controversial) science text of all time.

Many historians of biology credit the Origin with founding the modern science of biology. Hence, it is very curious that the first edition of the Origin lacks what most scholars expect to find in such influential and widely respected works. Unlike most other books of its kind — including Darwin's other famous books, The Voyage of the Beagle (first published in 1839) and The Descent of Man (first published in 1871) — the Origin has virtually none of the usual "machinery" of a scholarly work. Although Darwin cites the findings and opinions of hundreds of naturalists worldwide in the Origin, he does not provide any footnotes or written citations to their published works. The first edition of the Origin also does not include a bibliography nor any listing of published references. And, despite focusing on the most visual of the natural sciences, the Origin contains only one illustration, a hand–drawn diagram of the branching pattern of descent that Darwin proposed for his theory of descent with modification (his term for what we now refer to as "evolution").

The reason for this surprising lack of documentation is well known: Darwin had been scooped on his theory of natural selection by a fellow English naturalist, Alfred Russel Wallace. In April of 1858, Wallace sent Darwin a letter that included a brief essay "On the Tendency for Varieties to Depart Indefinitely from the Original Type", in which Wallace anticipated virtually all of the major concepts of Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection. Darwin had been working on his theory for over two decades, and had been writing the book that would eventually be published as the Origin for at least five years when he received Wallace's letter. Anxious to preserve his priority as the discoverer of natural selection and urged on to do so by his friends and fellow naturalists, Darwin rushed what he considered to be an "abstract" of his ideas into print in November of 1859. This "brief abstract", published without footnotes, illustrations, or bibliography, was the first edition of the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection.

The first edition of the Origin was a masterwork and is still published in its original form, without footnotes, illustrations, and bibliography. Reading it, one can still get a taste of the overwhelming scholarship with which Darwin supported what he called his "long argument" for descent with modification. However, to really appreciate how much of the science of natural history Darwin wove into his argument, one really needs to know what Darwin's sources were and how they were related to each other.

Presenting these sources and showing how Darwin marshaled them in his defense of his theory is the heart of James Costa's brilliant annotation of Darwin's classic, The Annotated Origin, published by Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Brought out in celebration of the 150th anniversary of the publication of first edition of the Origin, Costa's annotated version more than compensates for the "missing" material in Darwin's original. The introduction to The Annotated Origin alone is worth the price of the book. In it, Costa presents a lightning biography of Darwin and a nuanced exploration of the reasons for his rush to publish in 1859. It also contains a reader's guide to the Origin, a book that is often difficult for modern readers who are unaccustomed to the density of Victorian prose. Costa then analyzes and annotates virtually every page of the Origin, including the title page, in which he provides a brief history of Darwin's illustrious publisher, John Murray, and his decision to print only 1,250 copies of what would eventually become his best-selling and most famous publication.

Costa's annotations run the gamut from personal anecdotes to hard-science references. He weaves together Darwin's own telegraphic notes in his unpublished notebooks, his correspondence, his other published works, and his autobiography, providing the reader with a wealth of information and insight. Tracking down each line of evidence becomes a kind of "exploration" in itself. One can follow threads of evidence that elucidate Darwin's views about nature, science, his fellow naturalists, and even such "taboo" subjects (at least in the Victorian era) as sex and the intimate details of family life.

Costa's annotations also provide a detailed framework for Darwin's argument, showing how the various explanations and examples are marshaled in such a way as to support Darwin's underlying argument for "descent with modification by means of natural selection." As just one example, consider Costa's annotations to the section of pigeon breeding in the first chapter of the Origin ("Variation Under Domestication"). Naïve readers of this chapter are sometimes puzzled by Darwin's emphasis on pigeon breeding and its relationship to his theory. But, as Costa points out, "[p]igeons provided a microcosm of Darwin's model of selection, as well as valuable data on development, correlation of traits, and reversion." Like so many of his Victorian contemporaries, Darwin raised pigeons at his country estate at Down House in Kent, and conducted dozens of breeding experiments to test his theories. Darwin pointed out that all of the various breeds of pigeons could be shown to have descended from the wild rock pigeon (Columba livia) by a process that we now refer to as artificial selection. Darwin constructed an argument by analogy that natural selection followed the same rules as artificial selection. And, since so many of his contemporaries (and potential readers) were also pigeon fanciers, he could be reasonably confident that they would be able to follow his argument without extensive explanation or citations of obscure references to the scientific literature.

Reading the first edition of Darwin's Origin of Species is a revelation. One catches the threads of Darwin's argument and follows his reasoning through to his startling (and sometimes troubling) conclusions. James Costa's masterful annotation of the Origin does much more. It supplies the scholarly apparatus that the first edition lacked and provides a coherent and comprehensive background for Darwin's arguments, as well as many fascinating insights into Darwin's personality, thought processes and research methods. No other scientist has been as exhaustively analyzed as Darwin, and no other published work of science has been as widely criticized or praised as the Origin of Species. Reading James Costa's Annotated Origin provides an even deeper appreciation for Darwin's achievement and its impact on science and society.

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As always, comments, criticisms, and suggestions are warmly welcomed!

--Allen

More on Evolution and Human Free Will

Every summer I teach a seminar course at Cornell in which we examine the historical, philosophical, religious, and scientific implications of evolutionary theory. This summer our seminar course will once again consider the question: Is free will an illusion?

On the 15th of July, 1838, Charles Darwin began a notebook which he labeled as “M”, in which he intended to write down his correspondence, discoveries, musings, and speculations on “Metaphysics on Morals and Speculations on Expression”. On page 27 of that notebook, he wrote

“…one doubts existence of free will every action determined by hereditary constitution, example of others or teaching of others. (…man…probably the only [animal] affected by various knowledge which is not heredetary & instinctive) & the others are learnt, what they teach by the same means & therefore properly no free will. [Emphasis added]

In his private musing on the question of free will, Darwin came to the conclusion that human free will is an illusion, and that all of our actions (and, by extension, our thoughts and intentions) are the result of our “hereditary constitution” and “the example…or teaching of others.”

Some evolutionary biologists, notably William Provine of Cornell University, have followed Darwin’s lead and asserted that human free will is an illusion. Most philosophers disagree, asserting that free will is the principle difference between humans and non-human animals. Many Christian theologians go further, asserting that free will is the foundation of all human action, without which no rational ethics or theology is possible.

In our seminar course this summer we will take up this debate by considering two alternative hypotheses: (1) that human free will is real and can provide a basis for our morals and ethics, or (2) that human free will is an illusion, the capacity for which is a product of the same evolutionary processes that have shaped our anatomical and behavioral adaptations. Included in this debate will be an extended consideration of the hypothesis that the capacity for ethical decision making is an evolutionary adaptation that has evolved by natural selection. We will read from some of the leading authors on both sides of the subject, including George Ainslie, Daniel Dennett, Robert Kane, William Provine, Daniel Wegner, and Edward O. Wilson. Our intent will be to sort out the various issues at play, and to come to clarity on how those issues can be integrated into a perspective of the interplay between philosophy and the natural sciences.

Here are some particulars for the course:

INTENDED AUDIENCE: This course is intended primarily for students in biology, history, philosophy, religious studies, and science & technology studies. The approach will be interdisciplinary, and the format will consist of in-depth readings across the disciplines and discussion of the issues raised by such readings.

PREREQUISITES: None, although a knowledge of general evolutionary theory, evolutionary psychology, sociobiology, and the philosophy of human free will would be useful.

DAYS, TIMES, & PLACES: The course will meet on Tuesday and Thursday evenings from 6:00 to 9:00 PM in Mudd Hall, Room 409 (The Whittaker Seminar Room), beginning on Tuesday 29 June 2010 and ending on Thursday 5 August 2010.

CREDIT & GRADES: The course will be offered for 4 hours of credit, regardless of which course listing students choose to register for. Unless otherwise noted, course credit in BIOEE 4670 / BSOC 4471 can be used to fulfill biology/science distribution requirements and HIST 4150 / STS 4471 can be used to fulfill humanities distribution requirements (check with your college registrar's office for more information). Letter grades for this course will be based on the quality of written work on original research papers written by students, plus participation in class discussion. All participants must be registered in the Cornell Six-Week Summer Session to attend class meetings and receive credit for the course (click here for for more information and to enroll for this course). Registration will be limited to the first 18 students who enroll for credit.

REQUIRED TEXTS:

Ainslie, G. (2008) Breakdown of Will, Cambridge University Press, ISBN: 0521596947 (paperback: $34.99), 272 pages.

Dennett, D. (2004) Freedom Evolves, Penguin Books, ISBN: 0142003840 (paperback: $17.00), 368 pages.

Kane, R. (2005) A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will, Oxford University Press (USA), ISBN: 019514970X (paperback: $19.95), 208 pages.

Wegner, D. (2003) The Illusion of Conscious Will, MIT Press, ISBN-10: 0262731622 (paperback: $21.95), 419 pages.

Wilson, E. O. (2004) On Human Nature (Revised Edition), Harvard University Press, ISBN: 0674016386 (paperback: $22.00), 284 pages.

OPTIONAL TEXTS:

Darwin, Charles (E. O. Wilson, ed.) (2006) From So Simple a Beginning: Darwin's Four Great Books. W. W. Norton, ISBN-10: 0393061345 (hardcover, $39.95), 1,706 pages. Available online here.

Fisher, J., Kane, R., Pereboom, D., & Vargas, M. (2007) Four Views on Free Will, Wiley-Blackwell, ISBN: 1405134860 (paperback: $33.95), 240 pages.

Kane, R. (2001) Free Will (Blackwell Readings in Philosophy), Wiley-Blackwell, ISBN: 0631221026 (paperback: $33.95), 328 pages.

Wilson, E. O. (2000) Sociobiology: The New Synthesis (25th Anniversary Edition), Belknap Press, ISBN: 0674002350 (paperback: $44.00), 720 pages

Our summer seminar course is always fascinating, and often quite controversial (see this and this). Over the years we have explored many of the implications of Darwin's theory, and the participants have always found our discussions (perhaps they should be called "debates") enlightening. As always, the intent is not necessarily to reach unanimity, but rather for each participant to come to clarity on where they stand on the issues and to be able to defend that stance using evidence and rational argument.

So, please consider taking our seminar on free will this summer - the choice is yours!

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As always, comments, criticisms, and suggestions are warmly welcomed!

--Allen

More on "Meaningful" Information

In the ongoing debate about meaningful information at Uncommon Descent, one of the commentators asked:

"Does an of arrangement of nucleobases ‘adenine-cytosine-adenine’ in DNA mean anything?"

This is a surprisingly interesting and revealing question. To attempt to answer it, I would first like to put a limit on the question: let us consider the answer if the nucleotide sequence "adenine-cytosine-adenine" is in DNA (i.e. not RNA). If "meaningful" information is necessarily analogical, as I have suggested in the previous post on "Evolution, Information, and Teleology", then the answer to this question depends upon the circumstances in which the nucleotide sequence ACA is a part. If, for example, this sequence is part of a longer sequence of nucleotides in a longer DNA molecule, then there are several possible answers:

1) the DNA nucleotide sequence ACA could be located in a single strand of DNA that is suspended in a test tube (i.e. not in a living cell) and is therefore completely biologically inert (i.e. it is not binding to a complementary strand of DNA, nor being replicated, nor transcribed, nor translated);

2) the DNA nucleotide sequence ACA could be hydrogen bonded to the complementary sequence TGT (i.e. "thymine-guanine-thymine") in another strand of nucleotides that is anti-parallel with it and close enough to form hydrogen bonds between the nitrogenous bases;

3) the DNA nucleotide sequence ACA could be in a strand that is being replicated by DNA polymerase, which can synthesize the complementary sequence TGT in a newly synthesized strand of DNA;

4) the DNA sequence ACA could be in a strand of DNA that is being transcribed by RNA polymerase, which can synthesize the complementary sequence UGU in a newly synthesized strand of RNA;

5) the DNA sequence ACA could be in a strand of DNA that has already been transcribed by RNA polymerase into the complementary sequence UGU in a strand of mRNA that is bound to a ribosome and can be actively translated into an amino acid sequence in a polypeptide; or

6) the DNA sequence ACA could be in a strand of DNA that has already been transcribed by RNA polymerase into the complementary sequence UGU in a strand of mRNA that is bound to a ribosome and is being actively translated into an amino acid sequence in a polypeptide inside a living cell, within which the polypeptide has a biological function (i.e. participates in those biochemical reactions that maintain the cell alive/against the depredations of the second law of thermodynamics).

In case #1 the DNA nucleotide sequence ACA has no "meaning", in that it is not analogically related to anything. It also has no Shannon information nor Kolmogorov information nor Orgel information either, as it is not in the process of being transmitted or compressed, nor is it "specifying" anything.

In case #2 the DNA nucleotide sequence ACA has no "meaning" because its bonding with its complementary sequence is purely chemical, not analogical. Like the bonding together of water molecules in a snowflake (i.e. the regular crystalline solid form of water), the hydrogen bonding of the nitrogenous bases in complementary DNA sequences is wholly determined by "natural laws", and is therefore neither analogical nor meaningful.

Cases 3 and 4 appear to be the same as in case 2; the relationships between the nucleotide sequences and the bonding patterns therein are entirely the result of chemistry, with no analogical nor meaningful information involved.

However, in cases 5 and 6 we seem to come to a radical discontinuity. In both of these cases, there can be an analogical (and therefore "meaningful") relationship between the nucleotide sequence ACA in DNA and the corresponding amino acid sequence in a translated polypeptide, either in vitro or in a cell. What makes this difference possible (and what may make it necessary) is the analogical relationship between the nucleotide sequence and the corresponding amino acid sequence (if one exists). If the DNA sequence ACA is located in the template strand of an actively transcribed DNA sequence (i.e. a DNA sequence beginning with a promoter to which RNA polymerase can bind) and furthermore its complementary RNA analog is located in an mRNA molecule following the "start" codon AUG but not following a "stop" codon (either UAA, UAG, or UGA, assuming a three-base reading frame), then that the DNA sequence does indeed contain "meaningful" information: it is encoded in one medium, is translated into another medium, and has a function in the system of which it is a part.

It is not yet clear from current research whether or not the amino acid that is "translated" from the DNA sequence ACA (i.e. from the mRNA sequence UGU, assuming that the DNA sequence ACA is in a template strand) is necessarily related to that mRNA sequence. That is, we do not know with confidence whether the relationship between mRNA codons and the amino acids for which they code is purely arbitrary (i.e. the result of a "frozen accident") or if there is some as-yet-undetected necessary (i.e. "natural") relationship between them.

What we can say with reasonable assurance is that what distinguishes "meaningful" information from any other kind of information is not the material into which it is encoded, but rather the relationship between the information encoded in one physical medium and its decoded complement in a related physical medium. As Gregory Bateson pointed out many years ago, meaning is entirely in the relationship between material things; it is not the things themselves. Or, as Alfred Korzybski pointed out,

"The map is not the territory"

In the same way, meaningful information is not the medium in which it is encoded, transmitted, and decoded.

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As always, comments, criticisms, and suggestions are warmly welcomed!

--Allen