What's So "Intelligent" About "Intelligent Design"?

Many of the debates about "intelligent design" (ID) that I have read online have focused on the defintion of "intelligent". This is not necessarily because we all agree what "design" means, but rather because we know even less about that quality we refer to with the term "intelligent". If one cannot define what one means by "intelligent", then any attempt to define or investigate "intelligent design" would seem to me to be a futile exercise.

Some ID supporters have suggested substituting the term "purposeful design" for the term "intelligent design". To me, this sounds almost redundant; after all, design is all about "purpose", isn't it? And if that's the case, then "purposeful design" reduces to "purposeful purpose" or "designed design". Furthermore, it's not clear to me that the terms "intelligent" and "purposeful" are necessarily interchangeable, or mean even similar things.

Many ID supporters seem most upset about the implication that evolutionary theory is "random". That is, the processes by which new characteristics of living organisms come into being are not necessarily the result of intentional design. To many of them, this would eliminate a supernatural force or deity as the causal factor in biological evolution. Ergo, if one is committed to the intervention in nature of a supernatural force or deity, one must deny a priori the possibility that new characteristics of living organisms can come into being without "intention".

However, it is not necessarily the case that "purposeful" (i.e. teleological) objects and processes are necessarily non-random. First of all, it seems to me that "purposeful" is not an antonym for "random". For example, consider a falling rock: its movement as it falls is most definitely not random. Neither its trajectory nor its acceleration are "random" at all. On the contrary, they are predictable to such a degree that we call the mathematical description by which we can predict the movement of falling objects a "law" - the "law of gravity".

Ergo, it seems to me that the best antonym for "random" is "predictable", in the sense of being able to predict successive states in a dynamically changing system.

Given the foregoing, what is the best antonym for "purposeful"? Forgive me, but I think the only reasonable answer is "non-purposeful". This then forces one to define what one means by "purposeful". To me, the best definition of a "purposeful" (or "teleological", if you prefer the more technical term) object or process is "a dynamical process (or component of a dynamical process) in which the dynamical entity's actions are actively and homeotelically regulated by a cybernetic process that functions according to a pre-existing program, the outcome of which is a specified end state.

A homeotelic process is one in which a dynamical entity reacts to external perturbations from its original trajectory in such a way as to regain its original goal orientation. For example, an arrow fired from a bow is not homeotelic, whereas a heat-seeking missile is. By the same logic, a snowflake growing in a supercooled cloud is not homeotelic, whereas a virus replicating in a host cell is.

In my opinion, most of the arguments about "intelligent design" founder, not on the definition of "intelligent" but rather on the definition of "design". If one focuses not on "design" but rather on "purpose" (i.e. teleology), much of the disagreement (like a boojum) vanishes softly and silently away.

Indeed, I think the qualifier "intelligent" is unnecessary, and quite possibly redundant. Why argue over something – that is, "intelligence" – that is indefinable without self-reference?

That is to say, "purpose" is very clearly and unambiguously defined in cybernetics, as Gregory Bateson and Norbert Weiner pointed out a half a century ago. "Purpose" (aka "teleology") are what this argument is really about, and so it would help immensely if all of the participants on both sides of the debate would define it in such a way as to render its presence or absence empirically verifiable.

The same could also be wished about "intelligence", but I see no real hope for this, given that virtually every definition of "intelligence" given in this thread (and all previous threads) is neither empirically verifiable nor applicable to simple systems such as those found in viruses or very simple cells. How "intelligent" is the lambda bacteriophage? Compared to a human, not much; compared to a crystal of sodium chloride, tremendously so. Indeed, what separates crystallized viruses from crystallized salts is precisely the "quality" that separates life from non-life and "purposeful" from "non-purposeful" things.

Termites build termite mounds using a surprisingly simple set of "decision rules". For example, one decision rule (which is clearly "wired in" to the nervous system of worker termites) is the rule to stack particles of sand on top of each other and glue them together using a material like saliva in such a way as to produce an arch (this is beautifully illustrated in E. O. Wilson's masterpiece, The Insect Societies). In Höldobler and Wilson's new book, Superorganism, they explain in detail how insect societies produce astonishingly complex, adaptive, functional dwelling places, "highways" (army and driver ants), "farms" and "pharmacies" (leaf-cutter ants), etc. without anything that remotely resembles what we would call "intelligence" or "consciousness" (remember, their brains are smaller than a poppy seed and their life spans are measured in days).

Furthermore, none of the instructions for doing all of this "design" is encoded directly into the DNA of any given social insect. Rather, the instructions are "compiled" from the individual activities of thousands of individual insects performing very simple, stereotyped actions (mostly coordinated by chemical pheromones). In other words, the "intelligence" that produces the marvelous structures and functions of insect societies is a collective "intelligence" consisting of a small set of "decision rules" hard-wired into the nervous systems of individual insects.

Might it not be the case that this same process is the paradigm for all biological complexity? This would not only explain where the "designer" is (it's all around / inside us) and who the "designer" is (it's everyone, interacting collectively in producing the "superorganism"), it would also present what ID has so far completely lacked: an empirical research program. That is, one could search for the "decision rules" that produce biological complexity, in viruses, cells, insect societies, primate societies, and human societies, and figure out how the interaction of such rules produces biological complexity. And when you did that, you would have recreated the already-existing field of biology known as sociobiology, which is a branch of evolutionary biology.

Termites do not have "goals and foresight". Rather, they are quite literally programmed (i.e. "hard wired") to perform a surprisingly simple set of simple behaviors. They are born with this capability and do not have to learn it. Furthermore, their behaviors are extremely stereotyped and subject to quite a bit of essentially "random" variation. Despite this, and because there are so many of them (literally millions in some large hives), they collectively produce structures and functions that rival the most complex "artificial" factories and dwelling places designed by humans.

The point here is that "intelligence" is not being defined well at all, if it is restricted to humans and higher vertebrates, but not to insect societies. Each insect is definitely not "intelligent" (any more than each of our individual cells is), but collectively both the insect societies and our multicellular selves are intelligent. "Intelligence" is therefore an emergent property, rather than a pre-existing attribute. And evolution, of course, is all about emergent properties.

One of the points I tried to make earlier is that using human "intelligence" as a yardstick for intelligence in general is like using a Cray XMT as your yardstick for evaluating the "intelligence" of an abacus. In virtually every discussion I have read about "intelligence" at ID blogs, there seems to be an unspoken yet universal assumption that "intelligence" is an either/or phenomenon: either something is at least as intelligent as a human (or the Intelligent Designer aka God) or it isn't intelligent at all.

How "intelligent" a virus like the lambda bacteriophage? If "intelligence" is to be a useful (not to mention empirically measurable) phenomenon, it seems to me that it should fall somewhere along a spectrum, from the "intelligence" manifested by simple viruses up through the "intelligence" manifested by complex animal societies such as ours.

The latter point - that "intelligence" must somehow be massively multiplied as the result of social/collective interactions - is also non-trivial. As I pointed out earlier, an individual termite is extraordinarily "stupid", especially by human standards. Indeed, taken out of their social contexts, the behaviors of most social organisms seem pointless and almost random. However, what appear to be pointless and virtually random behaviors when viewed at the individual level become extraordinarily complex and "hyper-intelligent" when one moves up in organizational levels in animal societies.

How "intelligent" would each of us be, if we were forced to live in complete isolation from all other humans? If we were forced to do so from birth, our "intelligence" would be so limited as to result in almost instant death. Ergo, if one uses "able to live independently" as one's criterion for "intelligence", one would have to conclude that oak trees are immensely more intelligent than humans.

In my opinion, until ID theory comes to grips with the concept of "intelligence" in such a way as to make it both empirically verifiable and quantifiable, ID "theory" will continue to be not much more than unsupported speculation.

As a first approach to an operational definition of intelligence, consider whether learning is a necessary component of intelligence. Several commentators have strongly implied that this is the case. That is, the more an entity is capable of "learning", the more intelligent it is.

However, using the ability to learn as a criterion for intelligence is fraught with difficulties. For example, termites do not learn to build termite mounds, yet virtually everyone in this thread has agreed that mound-building behavior in termites indicates that termites (at least as a group) are indeed intelligent. Ergo, it is quite clear that an entity that is utterly incapable of "learning" can still qualify as being highly "intelligent".

This would also apply to some ID supporter's assertion that the Intelligent Designer is the God of the Abrahamic religions. This entity is universally recognized as being a "4-O deity": that is, He is omnibenevolent, omnipotent, omnipresent, and omniscient. However, this last quality also strongly implies that the ID/God does not learn from His actions, as to do so would be directly contradictory with His being forever omniscient (i.e. from the beginning to the end of time, assuming that time does indeed end). Ergo, the ability to learn is quite clearly not a criterion for determining intelligence, if one assumes that the Intelligent Designer of ID theory is the God of the Abrahamic religions.

If one is familiar with so-called "expert systems" in computing, the same would be the case. Expert systems (ESs) do not "learn" to do anything in the sense that animals with "wet" minds do. On the contrary, an ES performs a complex (sometimes recursive) calculation using data embedded in one or more "truth tables", producing a calculated outcome. This outcome is sometimes hedged with statistical error calculations, but it is a calculated (i.e. not learned) outcome nonetheless. While the final calculation produced by an ES can be modified, this happens only when the values in the "truth tables" are modified. Otherwise, the outcome is simply a calculation. Ergo, expert systems do not actually "learn" anything, at least in the same way that animals (and some other living organisms) do.

So, I believe that it is fair to conclude that the ability to "learn" is quite clearly not a necessary criterion for intelligence. Some highly intelligent entities (such as termite colonies and the God of Abraham) are clearly incapable of true "learning". Conversely, some very unintelligent entities, such as bacteria, are nonetheless capable of changing their behavior over time in response to changes in their environment (the standard operational definition of "learning" in the cognitive sciences).

CONCLUSION: Intelligence is fundamentally unrelated to the ability to learn.

Which brings us back once again to the fundamental question: what is "intelligence", how can it be observed, and can it be quantified in any way? If not, then ID is quite literally a "science" without an empirically definable subject, and therefore a pointless exercise in mental masturbation.

One might also be tempted to define "intelligence" as "adaptability". That is, an "intelligent" entity has the ability to adapt its behavior (and, presumably, its underlying cognitive machinery by means of which its behavior is generated and regulated) in response to changes in its environment. However, this presents two serious problems to an ID supporter:

1) "Adaptability" is what natural selection is all about. Why posit the existence of an "intelligent" entity that is capable of "adapting" to changes in the environment, when this is precisely what natural selection is supposed to be able to do?

2) Since ID is supposed to be a theory that explains adaptation, then saying that the Intelligent Designer (i.e. the entity that moulds adaptations) is adaptable is essentially defining "intelligence" via constructing a tautology:

• "intelligence" = "ability to produce adaptations"

• "intelligent design" = the process by which adaptations are created

Ergo, "intelligent design" reduces to "adaptability producing adaptations".

This is what is sometimes referred to in logic as the "dormative principle" argument, from Moliere's "The Imaginary invalid". When asked how or why opium produces sleep, the learned doctor replies "because it contains a 'dormative principle'"; that is, it causes sleep because it contains a material that causes sleep. In the same way, defining "intelligence" as "the ability to adapt to changes in the environment" (including changes that have not yet happened, i.e. foresight) reduces to "design that is 'adaptable' because it is 'adaptable'".

Where does this leave us in a search for an empirically quantifiable definition of "intelligence"? And if the answer is, "nowhere", then where does this leave "intelligent design"?

In the same line of argument, one clearly cannot define "intelligence" as "that principle/process/quality by which complex specified information is produced". To do so would once more be arguing via tautology:

Question: What produces "complex specified information"?

Answer: Intelligence.

Question: What is "intelligence"?

Answer: That principle/process/quality that produces complex specified information.

Ergo, "the principle/process/quality that produces complex specified information" is what produces "complex specified information".

Again, a pointless exercise in semantic gymnastics.

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As always, comments, criticisms, and suggestions are warmly welcomed!

--Allen

How Not To Fight A "Culture War"

There has been an interesting and often heated discussion about "methodological naturalism" taking place at Uncommon Descent. After more than 350 comments, the dispute about what "methodological naturalism" was, and how long scientists have been practicing it was resolved in the way that most such discussions are resolved: with the participants agreeing to disagree.

I think it would be interesting for both sides in the debate around methodological naturalism (MN) to consider why this term has become so widely used in recent times. For the sake of argument, let us assume that the entire concept of MN only became "solidified" following Paul de Vries' coinage of the term in 1983. Also for the sake of argument, let us concede that prior to that time the use of "non-natural" assumptions was indeed legitimate for at least inspiring scientific research (as, indeed, history shows us was clearly the case). Let us then further assume that the current application of MN does indeed exclude any reference to "non-natural causes", either in the design of experimental tests of hypotheses or in their interpretation.

One might then reasonably ask, "What happened in the early 1980s that prompted such a dramatic shift in the perception of scientists, so dramatic that it led most scientists to reject what had previously been allowable: that is, the use of "non-natural" hypotheses as an inspiration for scientific research (if not necessarily also in the interpretation of the results of such research)?

I believe that if one examines what was happening the early 1980s vis-a-vis evolutionary biology, the answer to this question is obvious: the rise of "scientific creationism" (especially of the "young Earth" variety) as a political force in the U.S., culminating in the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS)'s decision in Edwards v. Aguillard (
482 U.S. 578) in 1987. During the 1960s, American science was promoted very vigorously, both by the U.S. government and by scientists themselves, as a reaction to scientific advances by the Soviet Union (particularly the launching of Sputnik, the first artificial satellite). Part of this promotion involved the formulation of the Biological Sciences Curriculum Study (BSCS) protocol and its associated textbooks (the "blue", "green", and "yellow" versions). All three versions stressed evolutionary theory as providing a foundation for the biological sciences. This was virtually the first time since 1925 (and the conviction of John T. Scopes for having violated Tennessee's Butler Act by teaching evolution in a public school classroom) that evolutionary theory had been so prominently featured in biology textbooks that were widely promoted in the American public school system.

This caused an immediate negative reaction among American evangelical Christian groups. Legislative bans on the teaching of evolution similar to the Butler Act were either reinstated or promoted in several states. At the same time, Henry Morris and other "scientific creationists" founded and promoted the "scientific creationism" movement, which sought to provide scientific evidence for their version of "young Earth creationism" (YEC). Not much actual science was done by these self-described YECs, but strenuous political efforts were undertaken to have their YEC reinterpretations of existing scientific information incorporated into public school curricula in several states (most notably Arkansas and Louisiana).

In reaction to these efforts by YECs, the scientific community partnered with the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and allied organizations to bring such efforts to the attention of the SCOTUS, with the intention of having them outlawed as violating the first amendment to the US constitution. These efforts were ultimately successful, as both laws banning evolution from public school science classes and the attempts to insert YEC in public school science classes were struck down as unconstitutional by the SCOTUS. These events, and not the subsequent rise of Intelligent Design (ID), are the context within which the adoption of MN by the scientific community in the 1980s can most effectively be viewed.

From my interactions with them, I have found that some ID supporters are very strongly in sympathy with the YECs, and view ID as a way of getting their version of YEC back in the public schools. This was clearly the case in the Dover Area school board's 2005 attempt to provide students with alternative biology textbooks incorporating ID, as shown by the sworn testimony by several of the members of that school board and other members of the board who were present at meetings at which this plan was discussed and approved.

However, in my interactions with other ID supporters (and especially the members of the Cornell IDEA Club and some commentators at Uncommon Descent), I have come to understand that a significant fraction of ID supporters do not accept that YEC is a legitimate empirical science, nor support it's incorporation in public school science curricula.

The dispute that has occurred in this thread (and similar recent disputes elsewhere) seem to me to be examples of people "fighting the last war" rather than dealing with the situation as it exists today. ID supporters who are not YECs need to understand that most evolutionary biologists lump the two together, partly because of the behavior of the Dover Area school board and similar, more local situations in which YECs have persisted in pushing their views into the public schools. At the same time, evolutionary biologists and their political supporters need to understand that there is no necessary connection between YEC and ID, nor are they united in their conviction that YEC and ID must be incorporated into the public school curriculum today.

A recognition of the political contexts within which both evolutionary biologists and Intelligent Design supporters have come to their positions, and what these contexts imply about the value of possible further actions would be valuable for both sides in this debate. I have had many ID supporters say privately to me that Dover was a disaster for ID, and especially for its quest to be accepted as a legitimate empirical science. I have also had many evolutionary biologists express to me their opinion that there is essentially no difference between YEC and ID, a viewpoint that I have learned through experience is clearly in error.

Ergo, I have concluded that the most effective way to move forward in this debate is the way I have been conducting it since the mid-1990s. That is, to invite supporters of both sides of the debate to make presentations in my evolution courses and seminars at Cornell and to conduct such debates in public forums such as this website. Ironically, I find this venue to be much more congenial to such debates than places like AtBC, in which character assassination is the order of the day, rather than the last resort of people who are either confused about their own position or uncertain about its logical force.

And so, I recommend that all participants in this debate avoid name-calling and ad hominem arguments. For each committed commentator on both sides of this issue, there are many thousands of quiet observers who are trying to come to their own conclusions about the issues being debated. While mud-slinging is fun, it's fun in the same way that smoking or drinking heavily is fun; it provides short-term personal gratification, but in the long term it undermines everything one is trying to accomplish.

I believe that clarity should be our goal, not necessarily agreement. If we come to clarity about our positions and agree to disagree, then we have accomplished a great deal more than we would have accomplished if our goal was simply to attack our opponents' characters or to question their personal motives. Going forward I will do my best to pursue this course of action, and recommend that all who genuinely wish to come to clarity on these issues and, by doing so, help the "silent watchers" of this forum to do so as well, treat each other as colleagues (in the "collegiate" sense of that word) in their pursuit of what they perceive to be the truth, rather than as enemies in a culture war.

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As always, comments, criticisms, and suggestions are warmly welcomed!

--Allen

More on Teleology in Evolutionary Biology

I’ve been corresponding via email with a fellow evolutionary biologist (who shall remain nameless). I thought that some of her/his comments might be useful or interesting to those who read this blog, as they have a direct bearing on the "problem" of purpose (i.e. teleology) in evolutionary biology.

My correspondent's comments and questions are in block quotes:

I’ve been following the ‘Survival of the Sickest’ thread at Uncommon Descent, and have some comments on it and on your essay on the (un)reality of adaptations.

First, a major area of agreement between us is that the original post is fatally flawed by:

1) the assumption that “Darwinism” implies “constant progress”, and

2) failure to understand that fitness is always defined relative to a particular environment, and that environments change over time.

Now, on to some points of disagreement:

You mentioned Gould and Vrba’s 1982 paper on exaptation, and wrote:

"The reason is quite simple: if (as Gould, Lewontin, and Vrba argue) adaptation isn’t legitimately part of what evolutionary theory is about, then the whole idea of “design” and “function” is read completely out of evolution, leaving only descent with modification."

I have been very strongly influenced on this topic by Warren Allman, director of the Paleontological Research Institute here in Ithaca. He asserted that all adaptations should be considered to be exaptations. His rationale for this assertion was that the term “adaptation” has built into it an assumption of teleology. Literally translated, the word "adaptation" means “toward usefulness”. It’s the “toward” part that is the problem. As you and I both understand it, evolution (including natural selection, but not artificial selection) does not tend toward anything. It has no goal as far as we can tell. Ergo, it builds on what has gone before, but without any specific goal “in mind”.

This is why “exaptation” expresses better how we understand natural selection. It builds “away from” non-functionality (or even away from previous functionality), but never really “toward” anything at all as far as we can tell. And, if Sewall Wright’s “shifting balance” theory is a reasonable model of evolution, then it never really “arrives” anywhere at all, since the “goal” is constantly shifting anyway.

I’m wondering why you think that Gould and Vrba regard adaptation as being outside the legitimate scope of evolutionary theory. My take on the paper is not that they regard the concept of adaptation as illegitimate, but just that it has been typically construed too broadly and should be broken down into the categories of true ‘adaptation’ and ‘exaptation’, where they define a true adaptation thusly:

“Following Williams, we may designate as an adaptation any feature that promotes fitness and was built by selection for its current role.”

The problem I have with this definition is the inclusion of the words “promotes” and “for”. “Promotion” means exactly what it says: “motion towards” something. Ergo, using this word immediately suggests teleology, and as I have pointed out above, teleology cannot be a valid assumption in the origin of the products of evolution at any level. This is not because including teleology allows for “a divine foot in the door” (c.f. Lewontin, 1997), but rather because it requires that the “plan” for the teleological process must exist prior to the coming into being of that process. When we do things, this assumption is perfectly valid, but when something happens in nature, such an assumption is entirely unwarranted. Where, in nature, could such a pre-existing plan exist?

As for the word “for, I always point out to my students that teleological explanations virtually always reduce to sentences that include the phrase “in order to”. This can be shortened even further to “to” (leaving out the “in order”). However, the entire phrase “in order to” can be replaced with the word “for” without changing its meaning. Ergo, the definition quoted above is still irreducibly teleological, and therefore includes an assumption that we should not make in evolutionary biology.

In my paper on the evolution of the capacity for religious experience, I began with a succinct definition of “adaptation”, from which I lay out four criteria that a characteristic (i.e. a “trait”) must meet to be considered a genuine adaptation.

An evolutionary adaptation is any heritable phenotypic character whose frequency of appearance in a population is the result of increased reproductive success relative to alternative versions of that heritable phenotypic character.

Here are the four criteria that I believe must be met for a characteristic to be considered to be an adaptation:

1) An evolutionary adaptation will be expressed by most of the members of a given population, in a pattern that approximates a normal distribution;

2) An evolutionary adaptation can be correlated with underlying anatomical and physiological structures, which constitute the efficient (or proximate) cause of the evolution of the adaptation;

3) An evolutionary adaptation can be correlated with a pre-existing evolutionary environment of adaptation (EEA), the circumstances of which can then be correlated with differential survival and reproduction; and

4) An evolutionary adaptation can be correlated with the presence and expression of an underlying gene or gene complex, which directly or indirectly causes and influences the expression of the phenotypic trait that constitutes the adaptation.

I would now modify criterion #4 to state that such genes/gene complexes must be shown to have been conserved, relative to other sequences in the genome. However, one must keep in mind that such conservation, while necessary, is not sufficient. As we know now, some sequences are conserved, but can be knocked out, with no discernible effect on phenotype. Ergo, to fully satisfy criterion #4, a characteristic must be shown to be associated with a particular gene or gene complex, the knocking out of which can be shown to have significant negative effects on fitness.

Obviously, this means that a great many characteristics that we observe in living organisms will not qualify as adaptations. I believe that this is fully justified, following Williams’ assertion that the concept of adaptation is “onerous” and should only be resorted to “in the last resort”. It is only by doing so that we may avoid the otherwise almost inevitable pitfall of appealing to teleology in our explanations.

Gould and Vrba close their paper with this:

“The argument is not anti-selectionist, and we view this paper as a contribution to Darwinism, not as a skirmish in a nihilistic vendetta. The main theme is, after all, cooptability for fitness. Exaptations are vital components of any organism’s success.”

There’s that nasty little word “for” again! Fitness is immediately measurable as relative differential reproductive success, but “adaptation” can only be legitimately inferred retrospectively. We can’t say that something is a genuine adaptation until it already is, and this seems to me the kind of logical circularity that has also plagued Herbert Spencer’s phrase “survival of the fittest”. If we stick to the four criteria listed above, we will rarely fall into the trap that teleological thinking always sets for us.

Also, you later wrote the following, which seems to acknowledge that Gould and Vrba did regard adapation as a legitimate part of evolutionary theory:

“Yes, indeed, except that I believe that Gould, Lewontin (and later, Vrba) were, like Darwin, unwilling to take their principles to their logical conclusion: that adaptations (like species) are a figment of the human imagination, and do not actually exist in nature (or, to be even more precise, do not have to exist in nature).”

What I meant by this is that the only way we can actually “detect” the presence of adaptation is by inferring it. In that sense, adaptations are not “primary” characteristics; that is, characteristics that can be directly observed (such as differential reproductive success). Rather, such “secondary” characteristics must be indirectly inferred. In that sense, they are indeed “imaginary”; we must “imagine” that they exist (as the result of our application of inferential logic), as we cannot observe them directly.

Am I missing something? Are you trying to say that although Gould and Vrba regarded adaptations as real, they nevertheless thought they should be excluded from evolutionary theory?

No, I’m saying what Williams was saying, only I’m saying it more strongly and consistently: that we should never include any hint of teleology in our explanations, as such inclusion includes the biological equivalent of that old bugaboo of physics: “action at a distance” in physics is the equivalent of “goals preceding causes” in biology.

When I reread Williams’ famous 1966 book, Adaptation and Natural Selection, which supposedly reads teleology out of evolutionary biology, I was astonished to find it shot through with the same kind of teleological reasoning that he was supposedly trying to eliminate. I think I could find all the “hidden teleology” in Williams because I have spent so much time debating with ID supporters. They are the ultimate teleologists, and can always find where we have subtly woven teleological assumptions into our biology.

Finally, you wrote:

“To be as clear as I can, I believe that asserting a position of “metaphysical materialism” is just that: a metaphysical, not a scientific assertion. Confusing metaphysics with science is nearly as pernicious as confusing “ought” and “is”. The former makes for questionable science and the latter makes for questionable ethics.”

I would agree that science has no say on metaphysical questions that don’t have observable consequences (although I would argue that even then, Ockham’s razor should cause us to prefer simpler metaphysical systems to needlessly complex ones). However, some metaphysical assertions do have observable consequences. For example, I consider the existence of the Young Earth Creationists' God to be a metaphysical assertion that has nevertheless been decisively falsified by science.

I agree, but the same cannot be said for the more subtle versions of teleology found in Michael Behe or William Dembski's works. Their books (especially Dembski’s) present a much more subtle and less easily refuted version of teleological explanation, one that is easily reinforced by our own unwitting resort to teleological explanations.

Evolutionary adaptation is where the rubber of both evolutionary theory and ID hit the road.

Now on to your essay “Are Adaptations ‘Real’?”

You wrote:

“...although there are characteristics of organisms that are correlated with relatively high reproductive success (and would therefore be considered by most evolutionary biologists to qualify as “adaptations”), it becomes problematic to decide exactly which of those characteristics are the “real” adaptations and which are merely ‘accidental’”.

The problem, of course, is the words “real” and “accidental”. If we are genuinely dedicated to rooting out teleology in all of our explanations of the origins of biological objects and processes, then all adaptations are “accidental”, in the sense that they are all unplanned. We perceive them as having “functions” because our naive viewpoint of reality is always teleological. We can think non-teleologically only with very great difficulty. It’s like special relativity or quantum mechanics. We have to twist our minds to be able to even begin to conceive of them, and even then we constantly slide back into our naive (and unwarranted) views of reality.

True, if by “accidental” adaptations you mean exaptations. But while it may sometimes be difficult to tell whether an adaptation is “real” or “accidental”, that is not evidence that “real” adaptations don’t exist. Indeed, the only scenario I can envision in which “real” adaptations would not exist would be one in which every fitness-enhancing feature was an exaptation.

Exactly!

But that would mean, among other things, that every incremental improvement to the eye would have to have been the accidental result of changes that were selected for some reason other than improved vision. That seems far-fetched to me. Am I misunderstanding your position?

It’s not that that every incremental improvement to the eye would have to have been the accidental result of something, it’s that every incremental change to the eye would have had to originate accidentally, but then increase in frequency as the result of differential survival and reproduction. If we think the way you worded it (and we almost always think that way), then the teleological trap is that all of the incremental changes are somehow “predestined” and that complex eyes must be the inevitable result.

But this just plays into the hands of intelligent Design supporters. When we argue that “half an eye is still adaptive” we unwittingly include the assumption that “half an eye” is just that: half of what will ultimately evolve by natural selection. But our knowledge of the natural history of vision has shown us over and over again that “half an eye” is the whole thing in many cases. We can only say that the eyes of, say, flatworms, are “half an eye” because we already know that such a thing as a “whole eye” exists in cephalopods and vertebrates. We have to disabuse ourselves of the idea that any characteristic is only partially the whole deal. All characteristics of all organisms are the whole deal for those organisms, period, end of story, that’s all She wrote. Anything else contains the beginnings of teleology, and that way lies error, endlessly compounded.

We now have the ability to selectively delete individual characteristics from many different organisms. This makes possible something that natural selection does not: the precise determination of the selective “value” of particular characteristics. This has already been done, and the surprising outcome has been that even some gene sequences that were thought to have been very important in selection (due to having been “conserved” over deep evolutionary time) are apparently insignificant or useless. We know this because knocking them out of the genome has no discernible effect on the survival or reproduction of the “knock-out” progeny.

Precisely my point, above.

That interpretation seems to depend on the hidden assumption that the environment hasn’t changed significantly in the recent history of the organism, and that the experimental environment is fully representative of the historical environment over the entire time during which the features in question evolved. In the case of knocked-out sequences that have no apparent effect on fitness, how sure are we that the experimental environment is fully representative in this way?

No, but to assume that we are making the opposite mistake - assuming that some characteristic really has some function, even if that function is entirely unobservable - is once again to fall into the “teleology trap”. This is essentially the same argument that ID people make about “junk DNA”. Just because we haven’t found any function for it, doesn’t mean that all of it has no function. They argue that all of it must have some function. They are, like the evolutionary biologists for whom Williams, Gould and Lewontin, and Gould and Vrba wrote their warnings about, assuming teleology in evolution: they are, in a word, “pan-adaptationists”.

As a hypothetical example, imagine a bacterial DNA sequence that is expressed only during the formation of spores to protect the organism during periods of extreme environmental conditions. Knock out the sequence and test the viability of the resulting variant. If the experimental environment doesn’t include the extreme conditions that induce spore formation, the organism will never attempt to express the knocked-out sequence, and so its absence will not be noticed. If the experimenter concludes that the sequence is insignificant or useless, she is mistaken.

True, but I would strongly prefer that adaptation be considered a “diagnosis by exclusion” rather than our first and most important resort. By focusing on adaptation and natural selection, we teeter on the edge of the “teleology trap” and often (maybe even usually) fall in, despite our best efforts to avoid doing so.

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As always, comments, criticisms, and suggestions are warmly welcomed!

--Allen

Why Intelligent Design Supporters Insist That ID Must Be True

It has taken me a very long while, but I think I finally understand why Intelligent Design (ID) exists, why websites like Uncommon Descent exist, and why the regular commentators who support ID at those websites are so determined to assert the absolute reality of ID, in spite of a complete lack of empirical evidence.

It’s all right here in this quote about the ultimate justification for morality:

“Of course [the validity of an objective moral code] is all dependent upon the truth of the existence of God and the truthfulness of scripture - most of us here are aware of that.”

I believe that this is the crux of the whole science versus ID debate: if there is no empirical evidence for the existence of God, then it all comes down entirely to pure, unsupported supposition. Yes, one can assert that God exists, and can assert that therefore whatever God asserts must, by definition, be the absolute objective truth, but by the standards of scientific logic (which are now almost universally accepted as providing the most reliable evidence for descriptions of reality), arguments based purely and solely on assertion are no longer considered valid.

Ergo, without some independent source of evidence – independent of the original assertion, that is – then it all comes down to dueling assertions, which means that eventually it all comes down to force majeure: whoever can make the most forceful assertion gets to define the Truth.

Therefore, there must be some kind of empirical evidence for the existence of God. The fact that no one has ever found any is completely irrelevant, and will remain so indefinitely. It also explains why it is perfectly legitimate to deliberately distort, misinterpret, omit, or otherwise alter empirical evidence if it does not support the otherwise unsupportable assertion that God exists. [1]

Here is the way it looks to me:

Condition #1:

• If a moral code is not objective, it is ipso facto invalid.

• The moral code asserted by God is the only objective moral code. [2]

• If God does not exist, then there is no basis for the assertion that there is an objective moral code.

• Therefore, if God does not exist, anything is permitted.

Condition #2:

• An argument supported purely by assertion(s) is invalid. [3]

• Ever since Francis Bacon’s Novum Organum, it has generally been considered necessary that there should be empirical evidence (either direct or indirect) in support of arguments.

• Ergo, there must be empirical evidence in support of the assertion that God exists. Otherwise, there can be no objective morals, and therefore anything is permitted.

Conclusion:

Since God must exist (otherwise there are no morals and anything is permitted), then there must be empirical evidence for His existence. Finding none, it is therefore necessary to pretend that some exists, or to make some up. Otherwise there can be no objective basis for morals, society will necessarily collapse into chaos, and we will all inevitably become insatiable, maniacal, cannibalistic, orgiastic mass murderers, rapists, and thieves.

It also seems to me that this is the reason why ethical philosophers now virtually unanimously agree that ethical prescriptions cannot be derived from statements derived from empirical science (i.e. "ought" cannot be derived from "is"). To do so not only conflates two separate domains of logic (i.e. deductive versus inductive), but also requires that there be empirical evidence for something (i.e. ethical prescriptions) that are not and cannot be justified by empirical analysis (i.e. the workings of nature). Yes, we can use empirical analysis to determine if our ethical prescriptions have brought about the goals which we have decided to pursue, but we cannot use empirical analysis to formulate those goals.

Notes:

[1] Unsupportable on the basis of empirical evidence, that is.

[2] An obvious corollary to this is that each and every one of God’s moral prescriptions is both objective and absolutely True, by definition. Hence the argument that anything God prescribes (such as the massacre of the Canaanites) is morally right, simply by virtue of His saying so.

[3] To be specific, arguments based purely on deductive (i.e. Aristotelian) logic have been largely superseded by arguments based on inductive logic.

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As always, comments, criticisms, and suggestions are warmly welcomed!

--Allen

Evolution: Is Free Will An Illusion?

Every summer I teach a seminar course at Cornell in which we examine the historical, philosophical, religious, and scientific implications of evolutionary theory. This summer our seminar course will consider the question: Is free will an illusion?

On the 15th of July, 1838, Charles Darwin began a notebook which he labeled as “M”, in which he intended to write down his correspondence, discoveries, musings, and speculations on “Metaphysics on Morals and Speculations on Expression”. On page 27 of that notebook, he wrote

“…one doubts existence of free will every action determined by hereditary constitution, example of others or teaching of others. (…man…probably the only [animal] affected by various knowledge which is not heredetary & instinctive) & the others are learnt, what they teach by the same means & therefore properly no free will. [Emphasis added]

In his private musing on the question of free will, Darwin came to the conclusion that human free will is an illusion, and that all of our actions (and, by extension, our thoughts and intentions) are the result of our “hereditary constitution” and “the example…or teaching of others.”

Some evolutionary biologists, notably William Provine of Cornell University, have followed Darwin’s lead and asserted that human free will is an illusion. Most philosophers disagree, asserting that free will is the principle difference between humans and non-human animals. Many Christian theologians go further, asserting that free will is the foundation of all human action, without which no rational ethics or theology is possible.

In our seminar course this summer we will take up this debate by considering two alternative hypotheses: (1) that human free will is real and forms the basis for our morals and ethics, or (2) that human free will is an illusion, the capacity for which is a product of the same evolutionary processes that have shaped our anatomical and behavioral adaptations. Included in this debate will be an extended consideration of the hypothesis that the capacity for ethical decision making is an evolutionary adaptation that has evolved by natural selection. We will read from some of the leading authors on both sides of the subject, including George Ainslie, Daniel Dennett, Robert Kane, Daniel Wegner, and Edward O. Wilson. Our intent will be to sort out the various issues at play, and to come to clarity on how those issues can be integrated into a perspective of the interplay between philosophy and the natural sciences.

Here are some particulars for the course:

INTENDED AUDIENCE: This course is intended primarily for students in biology, history, philosophy, religious studies, and science & technology studies. The approach will be interdisciplinary, and the format will consist of in-depth readings across the disciplines and discussion of the issues raised by such readings.

PREREQUISITES: None, although a knowledge of general evolutionary theory, evolutionary psychology, sociobiology, and the philosophy of human free will would be useful.

DAYS, TIMES, & PLACES: The course will meet on Tuesday and Thursday evenings from 6:00 to 9:00 PM in Mudd Hall, Room 409 (The Whittaker Seminar Room), beginning on Tuesday 23 June 2009 and ending on Thursday 30 July 2009.

CREDIT & GRADES: The course will be offered for 4 hours of credit, regardless of which course listing students choose to register for. Unless otherwise noted, course credit in BIOEE 4670 / BSOC 4471 can be used to fulfill biology/science distribution requirements and HIST 4150 / STS 4471 can be used to fulfill humanities distribution requirements (check with your college registrar's office for more information). Letter grades for this course will be based on the quality of written work on original research papers written by students, plus participation in class discussion. All participants must be registered in the Cornell Six-Week Summer Session to attend class meetings and receive credit for the course (click here for for more information and to enroll for this course). Registration will be limited to the first 18 students who enroll for credit.

REQUIRED TEXTS:

Ainslie, G. (2008) Breakdown of Will, Cambridge University Press, ISBN: 0521596947 (paperback: $34.99), 272 pages.

Dennett, D. (2004) Freedom Evolves, Penguin Books, ISBN: 0142003840 (paperback: $17.00), 368 pages.

Kane, R. (2005) A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will, Oxford University Press (USA), ISBN: 019514970X (paperback: $19.95), 208 pages.

Wegner, D. (2003) The Illusion of Conscious Will, MIT Press, ISBN-10: 0262731622 (paperback: $21.95), 419 pages.

Wilson, E. O. (2004) On Human Nature (Revised Edition), Harvard University Press, ISBN: 0674016386 (paperback: $22.00), 284 pages.

OPTIONAL TEXTS:

Darwin, Charles (E. O. Wilson, ed.) (2006) From So Simple a Beginning: Darwin's Four Great Books. W. W. Norton, ISBN-10: 0393061345 (hardcover, $39.95), 1,706 pages. Available online here.

Fisher, J., Kane, R., Pereboom, D., & Vargas, M. (2007) Four Views on Free Will, Wiley-Blackwell, ISBN: 1405134860 (paperback: $33.95), 240 pages.

Kane, R. (2001) Free Will (Blackwell Readings in Philosophy), Wiley-Blackwell, ISBN: 0631221026 (paperback: $33.95), 328 pages.

Wilson, E. O. (2000) Sociobiology: The New Synthesis (25th Anniversary Edition), Belknap Press, ISBN: 0674002350 (paperback: $44.00), 720 pages

Our summer seminar course is always fascinating, and often quite controversial (see this and this). Over the years we have explored many of the implications of Darwin's theory, and the participants have always found our discussions (perhaps they should be called "debates") enlightening. As always, the intent is not necessarily to reach unanimity, but rather for each participant to come to clarity on where they stand on the issues and to be able to defend that stance using evidence and rational argument.

So, please consider taking our seminar on free will this summer - the choice is yours!

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As always, comments, criticisms, and suggestions are warmly welcomed!

--Allen

Evolution: The Darwinian Revolutions

Long-time readers of this blog will know that every summer I teach an introductory evolution course for non-scientists at Cornell. This year the focus of the course will be somewhat different. In honor of the bicentennial of the birth of Charles Darwin and the 150th anniversary of the publication of his monumental book, On the Origin of Species..., we will be focusing on the impact of Darwin's concept of evolution by natural selection, both on the sciences and on society as a whole.

Darwin's theory of evolution is the most revolutionary idea ever entertained by the human mind. It fundamentally alters our perception of reality. In profound and unsettling ways the theory of evolution changes our understanding of who we are, where we come from, why we do the things we do, and where we might be going. It does this by making us look carefully and dispassionately at the world around us, asking questions and seeking answers in the things we can observe.

This summer we will explore Darwin's theory and the impact that it has had on the sciences and on human society. Here is the syllabus for the course:

EVOLUTION: THE DARWINIAN REVOLUTIONS
BIOEE 2070 / HIST 2870 / STS 2871
Cornell University Six-Week Summer Session – Summer 2009

PREREQUISITES: None - Intended for non-science majors with an interest in evolutionary theory

CREDIT HOURS: 3 (does not count toward evolution distribution requirement in biological sciences)

CLASS TIMES: Mondays and Wednesdays 6-9 PM, Monday 22 June 2009 to Wednesday 29 July 2009

CLASS LOCATION: Lectures in Morrison Room, Corson-Mudd Atrium. Discussions TBA in class.

COURSE FORMAT: The format for each class will be a two-hour interactive lecture/discussion, in which the professor outlines the major concepts, followed by a one-hour discussion section in which all participants present their interpretations and opinions of the concepts and readings under consideration. Participants will also have the opportunity to make full-length presentations of their original work. Grades will be based on the quality of three essays, due at the end of each two-week segment. Students may also opt to do one essay and a research paper (see description and point scores, below).

GRADE BASED ON: Attendance and participation in lecture and section, plus combined letter grade on three essays (suggested length = 4 to 8 pages) or one essay and one research paper (maximum length = 20 pages), for a total of 100 points (electronic/email submission encouraged, but not required)

COURSE DESCRIPTION: Evolution is the founding concept of the science of biology. This course examines evolution in historical and cultural contexts. Aims of the course include understanding the major issues in the history and current status of evolutionary theory and exploring the implications of evolution for culture and human psychology. Issues range from controversies over mechanisms of evolution in natural populations to the philosophical implications of evolutionary theory.

REQUIRED TEXTS:

Darwin, Charles (E. O. Wilson, ed.) (2006) From So Simple a Beginning: Darwin's Four Great Books. W. W. Norton, ISBN: 0393061345 (hardcover, $39.95), 1,706 pages. Available online here

Goldschmidt, Tijs (1998) Darwin's dreampond: Drama in Lake Victoria, MIT Press, ISBN: 0262571218 (paperback, $27.00), 274 pages.

Jabloka, Eva & Lamb, Marion J. (2006) Evolution in Four Dimensions: Genetic, Epigenetic, Behavioral, and Symbolic Variation in the History of Life, MIT Press, ISBN: 0262600692 (paperback, $19.95), 474 pages.

Raup, David M. (1991) Extinction: Bad genes or bad luck? W.W. Norton, ISBN: 0393309274 (paperback, $14.95), 228 pages.

Ruse, Michael (2004) Darwin and design: Does evolution have a purpose? Harvard University Press, ISBN: 0674016319 (paperback, $19.50), 371 pages.

OPTIONAL TEXTS:

Darwin, Charles (1892) The autobiography of Charles Darwin (Nora Barlow, ed.), W.W. Norton, ISBN: 0393310698 (paperback, $14.95), 365 pages. Available online here

COURSE PACKET:

All of the course packet readings listed below are available from the course website. The password to access the course packet is “evolutioncp” (without the quotation marks). Alternate weblinks are provided for your convenience.

NOTE: Students will not be required to read all of these articles. Your instructor and/or TA will tell you which articles you are responsible for.

Ayala, F. (1970). Teleological explanations in evolutionary biology. Philosophy of Science, vol. 37, pp. 1–7.

Behe, M. (2002) Intelligent design as an alternative explanation for the existence of biomolecular machines. Unpublished manuscript.

Cosmides, L. & Tooby, J. (1997) Evolutionary psychology: A primer. Center for Evolutionary Psychology. Available online here

Dembski, W. (2005) What every theologian should know about creation, evolution, and design. Orthodoxy Today. Available online
here

Dobzhansky, T. (1973) Nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution. The American Biology Teacher, vol. 35 (March 1973), pp. 125–129. Available online
here

Eldredge, N. and Gould, S. J. (1972) Punctuated equilibria: An alternative to phyletic gradualism. In Schopf, T. J. M. (1972) Models in Paleobiology, Freeman, Cooper, & Co., pp. 82–115. Available online here

Gould, S. J. And Lewontin, R. C. (1979) The spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian paradigm: A critique of the adaptationist programme. Proceedings Of The Royal Society of London, Series B, vol. 205, no. 1161, pp. 581-598. Available online here

Huxley, T. H. (1860) Letter to Charles Kingsley, Available online
here

Jenkin, F. (1867) Review of Origin of Species. The North British Review, June 1867, vol. 46, pp. 277-318.
Available online here

Kaviar, B. (2003) A history of the eugenics movement at Cornell. Unpublished manuscript.

MacNeill, A. (2004) The capacity for religious experience is an evolutionary adaptation for warfare. Evolution and Cognition 10:1, pages 43 to 60.

MacNeill, A. (2005) Natural selection, sparrows, and a stochastic God. Available online here

MacNeill, A. (2006) Vertical polygyny in modern America: An evolutionary perspective. Available online here

Mayr, E. (1974) Telological and teleonomic: A new analysis. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, XIV, pages 91 to 117.

Mayr, E. (1982) The growth of biological thought. Harvard University Press. Chapters 12 & 13, pages 535 to 627.

Pinker, S. (2004) The evolutionary psychology of religion. Freedom From Religion Foundation. Available online here

Wegner, D. (2002) The illusion of conscious will. MIT Press: Cambridge. Chapter 3, pages 63 to 98.

PART ONE: THE ORIGIN OF EVOLUTIONARY THEORY
The science of evolutionary biology began with the publication of Charles Darwin's On the Origin of Species. It is one of the most important books ever written and should be read by any person who wants to understand who we are, where we come from, and why we are here (and how we know).

PART TWO: THE MODERN SYNTHESIS
Darwin's theory was accepted by most scientists of his generation within a surprisingly short time. Then, within just one more generation, it fell out of favor, replaced by genetic theories of evolution suggested by the rediscovered work of Gregor Mendel. Then, in another generation, the pendulum swung the other way, and Darwin's ideas were integrated with Mendel's and codified in the "modern synthesis."

PART THREE: MACROEVOLUTION, EVO-DEVO, AND BEYOND
Evolutionary theory has exploded in the fifty years since the "modern synthesis" was proclaimed. Sociobiology, punctuated equilibrium and new ideas about evolutionary psychology, genetic engineering, macroevolution, speciation…these are just a few of the directions that evolutionary theory and biology have expanded in the second half of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st.

I would like to invite anyone who has found this blog interesting to take this course, or follow along with us by keeping up with the course materials posted at the course website. Either way, you will find your mind being stretched and your view of reality challenged. What better way could one spend a few summer evenings?

See you this summer!

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As always, comments, criticisms, and suggestions are warmly welcomed!

--Allen

Platonic Ideal Forms Versus Evolutionary Developmental Biology

In a recent thread at Uncommon Descent,
Salvador Cordova wrote:

"[The existence of] platonic forms would strongly suggest that [evolutionary] transitional [form]s don’t exist. And if there are only lawful morphological forms, transitional forms, even in principle, couldn’t exist. Transitional forms and Platonic Forms don’t fit well together in any theory. It appears the two are mutually exculsive.

In engineering we have many platonic forms. As engineers we are taught to recognize and implement certain canned architectures. A lot of systems biology is mapping biological forms to the forms engineers recognize.

[The] quest for “correct designs” ... makes sense in a world of ideal forms, platonic forms. We instinctively have platonic forms in our mind. We have a sense that a defect is a defect, that an error is an error.

In the Darwinian world, it’s all about selective advantage. A blind cave fish is “selectively advantaged”. Defect is only a relative term. However in the eyes of plato, a blind cave fish is less than the ideal, it is a broken form. In such case, natural seleciton helped to infuse the defect in the population and thus introduce a defect that is not consistent with the ideal pattern.

The notion of platonic forms does not seem to be compatible with Darwinian evolution. [Emphasis added]

The idea of Platonic ideal forms in biology is an old one. The now mostly defunct tradition of orthogenesis is essentially a version of Platonic ideal forms applied to biology (and an argument can also be made that Lamarck’s progressive theory of evolution by means of the inheritance of acquired characteristics is as well). However, and contrary to what some might expect, applying the concepts of orthogenesis to "intelligent design theory" ("ID") is problematic, because in its early 20th century form, orthogenesis was considered to be progressive, but not goal oriented (i.e. teleological).

In addition to the early orthogenesists, two other names stand out in this tradition: D’Arcy Thompson and Stephen Jay Gould. Both were primarily concerned with the origin and evolution of form, and both developed theories of evolution based on this. Even J.B.S. Haldane (one of the founders of the “modern evolutionary synthesis”) wrote in this tradition in his essay "On Being the Right Size". Haldane’s musings on the relationship between size and constraints on form have become known as “Haldane’s Principle”, and have recently been applied to urban planning.

The newly emerging science of evolutionary developmental biology (”evo-devo”) has some similarities to orthogenesis, especially insofar as both are attempts to explain why the evolution of overall form (i.e. phenotype) appears to be constrained to certain types of forms, rather than all possible forms. The orthogenesists asserted that there are certain forms that are much more likely than others. These forms are similar in some ways to Platonic forms, in that there is no necessarily materialistic explanation for the predominance of certain forms, at least according to the theory of orthogenesis.

Evo-devo explains the similarities within “formal types” with reference to shared developmental programs, especially among eukaryotes. This shared developmental programming is based on the hierarchical gene regulation systems, most of which are based on homeotic gene regulatory mechanisms. Similar developmental constrains appear to exist among plants and fungi, but not so much among prokaryotes and multicellular protists. So, looking for things that resemble Platonic ideal forms in biology will probably involve identifying and categorizing the various developmental “channels” which are produced by these homeotic gene regulatory systems.

None of this, of course, says how the various hierarchical gene regulation systems originally evolved. This is another of those “deep time” problems, such as the origin of life and the origin of the genetic code. As I have commented repeatedly in the past, I believe that questions about such origins are almost certainly unanswerable using current empirical methods.

I also personally believe that the question of the origin of Platonic ideal forms (if such things exist and are empirically distinguishable from the various “channels” produced by the action of homeotic gene regulatory mechanisms) is both an open question and one that is almost certainly not answerable using empirical methods.

For more on the question of Platonic forms in biology, see this and this.

For a critique of my analysis of Platonic ideal forms in biology, see this.

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As always, comments, criticisms, and suggestions are warmly welcomed!

--Allen